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Executive summary 
Can official Islamic institutions play a role in preventing violent extremism? Most Arab 
governments have granted a role to religious institutions in this regard in recent years. Yet, the 
cases of Lebanon, Morocco and Saudi Arabia exhibit considerable differences. In Lebanon, the 
role of Sunni religious institution Dar al-Fatwa is limited. Due to the weakness of state capacity 
and to the external interference in the country, Dar al-Fatwa is hardly able to coordinate Sunni 
religious activities there. The corresponding institutions in Morocco and in Saudi Arabia, 
however, are powerful, and also perform foreign policy roles through religious diplomacy.  
The role assigned by governments to official Islamic institutions in the struggle against violent 
extremism varies. In the Arab world, the use of these institutions has been most prominent in 
monarchies with inherited religious legitimacy – in Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan in 
particular. Morocco and Saudi Arabia have also been using their control of Islam to become 
regional hegemons. Morocco has been gaining more soft power religious influence in several 
countries, while in Saudi Arabia, recent reforms have curbed the influence of the Saudi ulama 
on domestic and foreign policy. 
Arguably, Morocco’s official religious institutions are among the more competent and have 
more legitimacy among the believers than their counterparts in other Arab countries. The 
Habous (Endowment) and Islamic Affairs Ministry is considered a strategic ministry, and its 
control is still a Crown prerogative. However, the effectiveness of the country’s measures to 
prevent violent extremism can be questioned, since Moroccans constitute the third largest 
                                                 
1 This research report was written during a Max Weber scholarship at the the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies at the EUI (2017-2018). It was also partially funded by the Research Council Norway-funded 
project ‘Hybrid Pathways to Resistance in the Islamic World’ (2017-2020). The paper is based on secondary 
literature, as well as on discussions during a joint NUPI–Issam Fares Institute (IFI) workshop on political Islam, 
organised at the American University in Beirut on 2 December 2017. It also draws on the author’s interviews 
with Lebanese and Iraq religious officials. The paper was presented at MERI Forum in Erbil in October 2018. 
2 The author wishes to thank Olivier Roy, Laila Makboul, Bjørn Olav Utvik, Luigi Narbone, Georges Fahmy, 
Agnès Favier, Sarah St. John, Alyson Price and Fiona Barsoum for useful comments on an earlier draft. Special 
thanks are extended to participants at the joint NUPI–IFI workshop on political Islam, organised at the American 
University in Beirut on 2 December 2017, Sari Hanafi and the IFI staff and director. 
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nationality group among foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, after Tunisians and Saudis (if 
Moroccan bi-nationals living in Europe are included in the statistics). In Saudi Arabia, by 
contrast, a precondition for efficiently countering jihadism would be to give priority to this 
struggle, rather than to the regional contest with Iran.  
Saudi Arabia is currently undergoing important transformations, which impact on the country’s 
religious diplomacy and export of Salafism. The decision by the influential Crown Prince 
Mohamed bin Salman (MbS) to create new, ad hoc institutions to combat violent extremism 
outside of state religious institutions shows that he has taken steps to centralise ideological 
production. However, the recent arrests of religious clerics in the Kingdom have also targeted 
Islamic constitutionalists. This has undermined Saudi Arabia’s ability to combat violent 
extremism at the ideological level, because the number of influential religious figures taking on 
this role has become more limited. Moreover, it is unclear whether the Saudi Kingdom has a 
Plan B for maintaining regime legitimacy should its religious legitimation wane. The two-tier 
system seems set to prevail, with the Kingdom simultaneously taking the lead in the struggle 
against extremist thought and in spreading anti-Shi‘a propaganda. 
In Jordan and Morocco, the religious establishment has an important role in the countries’ 
respective programmes to prevent violent extremism. Conversely, Islamic institutions have not 
been assigned a similar role in Lebanon, where the response to jihadism so far has been 
concentrated in the security sector. However, many Lebanese Islamic actors want to be 
recognised as allies in the struggle against violent extremism; they have common interests with 
Western and Arab governments in combating violent extremism.  
However, in today’s climate of government control over official religious institutions, state-led 
religious institutions lack popular legitimacy, not least in Lebanon. In order to successfully 
implement measures to prevent violent extremism, Islamic institutions should be granted more 
autonomy by their governments. Recent reforms have enabled Morocco to combine pluralism 
in the religious field with a continued strong influence of the religious establishment over the 
believers. Used cautiously, Morocco could serve as a model for Lebanon and other Arab 
countries seeking to reform their religious institutions and increase the state’s efficiency in 
preventing violent extremism. Pluralism in the religious field, decentralisation and 
professionalism of the official religious institutions seem to be effective antidotes against 
violent extremism across national contexts. The attempts of governments to completely 
subordinate the religious sphere to their wills often lead to a backlash, because citizens often 
lose confidence in the official religious figures.  
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Full report 
 
Can Islamic institutions be seen as allies in the struggle against violent extremism rather than 
as part of the problem? If so, what role can religious leaders and official Islamic institutions 
play in countering extremist thought? 
Former UN Security General Ban Ki-moon’s report titled Strengthening the Role of Mediation 
in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution considers the 
potential contribution of religious actors and faith-based organisations in the prevention of 
violent extremism to be underutilised.3 Such actors are often well connected at the local level, 
can increase local ownership over Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) efforts, and provide 
psychosocial support to vulnerable groups.4 
Initially taken by surprise, Islamic institutions in the Arab world were for a long time 
unprepared to face the challenge of violent extremism.5 Yet today, most Arab states actively 
use their official religious institutions to prevent or counter violent extremism.6 Most notably, 
monarchies with inherited religious legitimacy have used this strategy, but Egypt’s ancient Al-
Azhar institution has also played a role. In 2014, Al-Azhar organised a conference that 
condemned violence and suggested steps to fight jihadism and religious extremism. However, 
religious and civil society organisations are calling on religious institutions to go beyond pure 
condemnation and instead clarify religious concepts, one by one, in order to challenge 
extremists and their interpretations of religion. 
This report analyses the measures taken by Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Lebanon to strengthen 
official religious institutions in the prevention of violent extremism. These three cases are 
chosen because they illustrate different types of challenges that religious authorities may face 
in their work to prevent violent extremism.7 Saudi Arabia and Morocco are traditional 
monarchies based upon the upholding of religious legitimacy, with ancient or centuries-old 
religious institutions. However, suicide attacks in both kingdoms (in 2003–2004) showed that 
they were not immune from jihadi terrorism. Both regimes responded by initiating a process of 
modernisation of domestic religious institutions.  
                                                 
3 United Nations General Assembly, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 
Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Report of the Secretary-General, A/66/811 (25 June 2012), p. 16. Available 
from http://undocs.org/A/66/811. 
4 Melissa Nozell and Susan Hayward, ‘Religious Leaders Countering Extremist Violence: How Policy Changes 
Can Help’, United States Institute for Peace, 31 October 2014. 
5 Radwan El Sayyed, ‘Religious Institutions and the Challenges of Extremism and Terrorism’, in Beatrix Austin 
and Hans J. Giessmann (eds.), Transformative Approaches to Violent Extremism, Berhof Foundation, Handbook 
Dialogue No 13, 2018. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Unlike counter-terrorism, PVE focuses on prevention, and includes programmes such as promoting community 
resilience, moderation and social cohesion. In many European countries, such programmes rely on the welfare 
state, a municipality-driven multi-agency approach and NGOs. The Action Plan of the UN Secretary-General to 
Prevent Violent Extremism (December 2015) acknowledges that no clear definition of violent extremism exists. A 
challenge is that while violent extremism is not associated in principle with any religion, most actual programmes 
to prevent or combat violent extremism focus to a great extent on violent jihadism.  
 4 
In Morocco, where strong religious institutions exist, the institutions have supported and been 
involved in much of the effort devoted to PVE. This work has included reviewing textbooks 
and curricula of Islamic studies programmes in state primary and middle schools and Islamic 
schools, as well as providing vocational training and capacity building for mosque imams.8 
Saudi Arabia’s programme employing Wahabi clerics9 to re-educate and rehabilitate jihadis in 
jail is well-known. However, recently, the Kingdom and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries have opted to centralise religious discourse and create new institutions to fight 
extremism. Morocco and Saudi Arabia are also regional hegemons. Religious actors from 
Morocco and Saudi Arabia are integrated into their countries’ soft power strategies, but have 
enough autonomy to play independent foreign policy roles in Europe, North Africa, the Sahel 
and the Middle East. 
In Lebanon, only a domestic role is expected of the official Islamic institutions. However, they 
often fall short of fulfilling this role. Lebanon’s sovereignty has often been undermined by 
external interferences. The weakness and inability of Lebanon’s official Islamic institutions to 
defend the Levantine Shafi‘i or Hanafi interpretations of Islam against Hanbali Salafism, 
exported from the Gulf countries, is just one example of this. Moreover, Lebanon is a case 
where official Sunni Islamic institutions were created by colonial powers, and thus lack 
historical credibility. Moreover, Lebanon has thus far taken a securitised approach to jihadism, 
which does not entail involving religious actors in PVE efforts.  
There is unexploited potential in the strategy to involve state religious institutions in the 
struggle against violent extremism. Religious clerics in countries as different as Lebanon and 
Iraq explicitly say that they would like to be granted a more important and more autonomous 
role.10 Yet across cases, the fact that official religious institutions lack credibility in the eyes of 
regular believers is a challenge. Moreover, measures to prevent violent extremism are 
inherently political and can only be understood in light of the more general balance of political 
forces in a country. 
                                                 
8 Ilan Berman, ‘Morocco’s Islamic Exports: The Counterterrorism Strategy Behind the Mohammed VI Institute 
for the Training of Imams’, Foreign Affairs, 12 May  2016, available 
at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-05-12/moroccos-islamic-exports.  
9 Wahabism is a term used by non-Saudis to refer to the non-political version of Salafism followed specifically by 
the Saudi clergy. Total obedience to the ruler (wali al-‘amr) is a central tenet of this doctrine. Although Saudi 
Arabia used the term ‘Wahabi’ until the 1920s, it is today seen as derogatory, and the more general term ‘Salafism’ 
is used. David Commins, ‘From Wahhabi to Salafi’, in Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane 
Lacroix (eds.), Saudi Arabia in Transition. Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 151–166, at pp. 158–159. 
Salafis are distinguished by their common doctrine (‘aqida) centred on strict adherence to the principle of tawhid 
(the oneness of Allah) and their rejection of human reasoning and logic. Politicised ‘activist’ Salafis and jihadi 
Salafis oppose Wahabis (apolitical Salafis). Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, 29, 2006, pp. 207–239, at p. 207. 
10 Author’s interviews with religious officials in Lebanon, December 2017, December 2018, and with religious 
officials in Iraq, October–November 2018. 
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‘Authoritarian upgrading’ and government control of the religious field 
‘Authoritarian upgrading’ is a term coined by Steven Heydemann in 2007 to designate the 
adaptation of authoritarian governance structures to contemporary domestic and external 
pressure. The aim is to ensure regime resilience. One aspect of this is selective liberalisation of 
the economy, which enables a diversification of external alliances, for instance by becoming 
more acceptable to Western donors.11 The strengthening of government control over religious 
activities may be considered another key, under-researched feature of this strategy.  
Increased government control of religious activities often takes place under the pretence of 
preventing violent extremism, but also often aims to put pressure on domestic opponents, often 
electoral opponents of the regimes. Yet many cases have shown that when governments 
strengthen state control over the religious field, government-supported religious leaders lose 
legitimacy. This can lead to a backlash, as youths seek out alternatives to the official religious 
institutions. This paves the way for the fragmentation of the religious field and a world of 
underground movements in which violent actors may thrive. Poor governance and/or the 
weakness of the rule of law are key drivers of violent extremism in many Arab countries.12  
The most famous example is when, after the reform of the Egyptian Al-Azhar in the 1950s, 
Egyptian clerics and imams became state employees, dependent on the government for their 
salaries.13 Friday sermons vigorously defending then President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s policies 
were famously faxed from the government to the head of Al-Azhar.14 The institution’s 
popularity plummeted, paving the way for the fragmentation of religious authority and the rise 
of violent groups such as al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya and al-Gihad.15  
This paper shows how such strategies seeking to impose government control over the religious 
field have risen in importance since the rise of Daesh in 2014.16 However, promoting professors 
of liberal theology to counter extremist thought does not necessarily help. Militants often join 
Daesh because they are specifically looking for and attracted by the radicalism of its ideology.17 
                                                 
11 Steven Heydemann, ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World’, Analysis paper, No 13, The Saban 
Centre for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2007, at p. 5. 
12 For a comparative study, see Luigi Narbone et al. (eds.), Inside Wars: Local Dynamics of Conflicts in Syria 
and Libya, Firenze: European University Institute, 2016. 
13 Malika Zeghal, Gardiens de l’Islam. Les oulémas d’al-Azhar dans l’Égypte contemporain, Paris: Presses de 
Sciences Po, 1996, at pp. 98–113. 
14 For Friday sermons under President al-Sisi, see Emily Crane Linn, Nicholas Linn, ‘Sisi’s Islam’, Foreign 
Policy, 2 June 2015; Ahmad Hidhi, ‘Egypt’s new plan: 1 weekly sermon for over 80 million Muslims’, al-
Monitor, 20 June 2016. 
15 Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The prophet and pharaoh, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1986. 
16 Daesh is an Arabic acronym used to designate the jihadi group Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (al-dawla al-
islamiyya f’ish-Sham wa’l-‘iraq). 
17 Olivier Roy, Jihad and Death. The Global Appeal of the Islamic State, London: Hurst, 2017. Radicalisation 
can be defined as a process of interaction between a social movement and the state, where the former gradually 
changes perceptions, and/or actions (often, embracing the use of violence). Donatella della Porta and Gary 
LaFree, ‘Guest Editorial: Processes of Radicalization and De-radicalization’, International Journal of Conflict 
and Violence, 6(1), 2012, pp. 4–10, at pp. 6–7. 
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Academic discourses on Islam are likely to fall on deaf ears. The question of how to build a 
non-Salafi version of Islam, with popular credibility, is therefore timely.  
Saudi Arabia: the gradual erosion of the Wahabi–Saud pact under MbS? 
Since the rise of Daesh, Saudi Arabia has made significant efforts to fight jihadism at the 
domestic and international levels. These efforts also promote simultaneously Saudi national 
interests and propel MbS to the centre of Saudi and regional politics.  
 
The history of the Counselling Programme and the Intellectual Security Campaign  
 
The origin of Saudi counter-terrorism and PVE measures goes back to the 9/11 attacks in the 
United States. After it became known that 15 of the 19 hijackers were of Saudi nationality, US 
pressure forced the Kingdom to introduce political reforms and clamp down on the finances of 
Wahabi networks abroad.18 Reforms accelerated after al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) struck inside the Kingdom in 2003–2004. Alongside a strong police and security 
offensive,19 Saudi Wahabi scholars were given an important role in a Counselling Programme 
(al-Munasaha) aimed at re-educating Saudi jihadis in jail.20 This programme, also known as 
the Advisory Committees, began inside several Saudi prisons under the leadership of Assistant 
Interior Minister for Security Affairs Mohamed bin Nayef (Interior Minister from 2012) after 
the first jihadi attacks in Saudi Arabia in 2003.21 It involved theological debates with 
distinguished Saudi religious clerics, in addition to psychological counselling by psychologists 
and social workers, as well as art therapy. A separate Counselling Programme for Saudis from 
Shi‘a families was also created, but only with psychotherapy and without the religious 
component.22  
 
 The Counselling Programme does not address jihadism per se, but ‘religious deviation’ 
(inhiraf) and exaggeration or fanaticism (ghuluw) in religious practice.23 These Qur’anic terms 
constitute the base of the Saudi approach to PVE more generally. Jihadis are seen as unguided 
youths, who need patronage and guidance. In other words, Wahabism, Saudi Arabia’s state 
religion, is in itself not questioned, but is used as an instrument in the struggle against jihadism. 
The programme stresses the importance of full obedience to the ruler (wali’ al-amr). It re-
affirms the power of the monarch as a ‘benevolent patron’, who protects and guides zealous 
                                                 
18 F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism’, in Adam Garfinkle (ed.), A Practical Guide 
to Winning the War on Terrorism, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2004.  
19 Mohamed M. Hafez, ‘Radicalization in the Persian Gulf: Assessing the Potential of Islamist Militancy in 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen’, in Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. Pathways towards Terrorism and Genocide, 
London: Routledge, 2008, pp. 1–19, at p. 10. 
20 Christopher Boucek, ‘Extremist re-education and rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia’, in Tore Bjørgo and John 
Horgan (eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, London: Routledge, 2009, 
pp. 212–223, at pp. 214–215; Thomas Hegghammer, ‘There is nothing soft about Saudi counterterrorism’, Foreign 
Policy, 11 March 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/11/there-is-nothing-soft-about-saudi-
counterterrorism/. 
21 Mohamed bin Nayef was appointed crown prince in 2015, but removed from all his positions in 2017 when 
the order of succession was changed in MbS’s favour. 
22 Informal discussion, Saudi researcher, place not disclosed, October 2018. 
23 Meijer et al., Counter-terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, at p. 142, 129. 
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youths back to the ‘right path’. The programme increases the social power of conservative 
clerics over youths, and diverts attention away from potential shortcomings in governance, or 
socio-economic or cultural challenges, which could fuel political violence.  
 
The programme’s goal is repentance and reconversion. In concrete terms, the convicts should 
recognise the authority of the monarch as wali’ al-amr.24 By 2009, around 4900 persons were 
reported to have participated in the programme, including 1500 who were released from Saudi 
jails in 2007 and put under surveillance.25 The programme is only open to those arrested for 
supporting terrorism who ‘do not have blood on their hands’. It is divided into three pillars: 
prevention (wiqaya), rehabilitation (ta’hil) and recovery (naqaha). The Mohammed bin Nayef 
Counselling and Care Centre, an aftercare centre in Riyadh, has allegedly been able to reconvert 
many former Guantánamo Bay prisoners from jihadism.  
 
Overall, despite some high-profile cases of recidivism,26 the programme is deemed relatively 
successful, since it is credited for having ended the AQAP campaign inside Saudi Arabia 
(although it continued in Yemen).27 However, there are no statistics, except for those provided 
by the Saudi government, and it is difficult to know whether the massive economic incentives 
on youths to disengage mean they actually abandon their former beliefs (deradicalization).28 
Indeed, many of those who pass the exam and are released are given material compensations, 
such as scholarships and paid weddings.29  
 
The programme is difficult to export, since the use of Salafism to counter and prevent violent 
extremism is more easily conceivable in a state where (Wahabi) Salafism is the state religion.30 
The programme helps in institutionalising the boundaries of Saudi Arabia’s Wahabi orthodoxy 
vis-à-vis Salafi jihadism and Muslim Brotherhood thought. It further re-asserts the theoretical 
(‘scientific’) grounds for the apolitical Salafism tradition as an ethic of normalcy.  
 
A preventive campaign for the general public, dubbed Intellectual Security (al-aman al-fikri), 
was launched in 2005-2007. It aimed to raise awareness, immunise Saudi culture and society 
                                                 
24 Meijer et al., Counter-terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, at p. 142.  
25 Zina D. Merrit, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Combating Terrorism and Its 
Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed, United States 
Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-883, September 2009.  
26 ‘Saudi Shura member spots 'need' to revise terrorist rehab program’, Saudi Gazette, reprinted in al-Arabiyya, 
16 December 2014.  
27 M. Hafez, ‘Radicalization in the Persian Gulf’, p. 4. The recidivism rate in the aftercare centre was at about 
20% overall (some figures report 14%), and was concentrated among those who had been detained at 
Guantánamo Bay. UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism on his Mission to Saudi 
Arabia’, 6 June 2018. 
28 For this debate, see Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds), Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective 
Disengagement. London Routledge, 2009. 
29 Casptack, Andreas, ‘Deradicalization Programs in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study’, Middle East Institute, June 10, 
2015, http://www.mei.edu/content/deradicalization-programs-saudi-arabia-case-study; ‘Terrorist Rehab: Rare 
Look inside Saudi De-radicalization Programme’, CBS This Morning, 19 November 2014, 
https://youtu.be/JupSK4odKWQ. 
30 However, since 2014, many Arab and European countries, as well as the US, have become increasingly 
concerned with the spread of hate speech and radicalisation in jails and have engaged more Muslim chaplains. 
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from threats to Islam and deviant thought, and protect youths.31 Like the Counselling 
Programme, it also involved religious clerics, like the religious police, religious personnel in 
charge of Friday sermons and of Qur’an memorisation, who were told that they had an 
important role to play in spreading moderate thought and detecting early signs of extremism. 
Moreover, ‘successful’ rehabilitees from the Counselling Programme were co-opted by the 
government and actively used in general prevention. 
 
The Intellectual Security Campaign has an academic component: the Mohamed bin Nayef Chair 
in Intellectual Security Studies was opened at King Saud University in 2008, and many 
international academic conferences on intellectual security are held.32 ‘Intellectual security’ has 
become a field of academic study. In this (mainly Saudi) discourse, ‘deviant thought’ is seen as 
the main cause of terrorism, and ‘intellectual security’ as the remedy.33 Emphasis is put on the 
Islamic ‘middle way’ (wasatiyya) and the need to obey the ruler. The campaign targets youths 
because around 70% of the Saudi population is under the age of 30, and this category is also 
over-represented among perpetrators of political violence in the Kingdom.  
 
However, the categories of ‘threats to Islam’, ‘deviant thought’ and ‘intellectual terrorism’ are 
not clearly defined. Although often used for jihadi terrorism, it also includes ideological 
opponents of the Kingdom, like the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. The aim of the 
Intellectual Security Programme is to strengthen ‘true’ Salafi thought and promote the ‘security 
of the nation’ and national unity.  
 
The Intellectual Awareness Programme continued under King Salman (2015-), and has been 
used to warn students at the Imam Muhammad Bin Saud Islamic University against extremist 
preachers and even so-called ‘terrorist groups’, such as  the moderate Muslim Brotherhood 
organisation and the Lebanese Shi‘a Hizbullah.34 Moreover, the National Dialogue Forum, first 
launched in 2003 to promote national unity and address demands for constitutional reform, has 
continued.35 Spearheaded by then Crown Prince Abdallah to improve the international 
reputation of Saudi Arabia after 9/11, the annual dialogue meetings brought together 
representatives of the Saudi Sahwa Movement, Sufis and Shi‘a religious clerics.36 They are 
considered to have played an important role in the growing acknowledgment of pluralism in 
Saudi society and culture. They were led by the King Abdul Aziz Centre for National Dialogue 
                                                 
31 Meijer et al., Counter-terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, at p. 138. 
32 ‘Saudi Arabia’s Religious Counter-Terrorist Discourse’, Middle East Institute, 15 February 2015, 
http://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-arabias-religious-counter-terrorist-discourse. 
33 Zina D. Merrit, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Combating Terrorism and Its 
Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed, United States 
Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-883, September 2009. 
34 ‘Imam University warns students, staff against extremist preachers’, Saudi Gazette, 26 March 2018, 
http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/531337. 
35 Abdul Hanan Tago, ‘National dialogue on extremism launched’, Arab News, 1 January 2015.  
36 Stéphane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 244. The Sahwa (‘Awakening’) movement was a Saudi 
social conservative Muslim Brotherhood-inspired political opposition movement, which criticised the House of 
Saud for its decision, during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, to accept a large contingent of US troops on its soil. 
Several high profile personalities, like Salman al-Awda and Safar al-Hawali, were arrested in 1994 and 
rehabilitated in 1999. (However, see below for more on their arrests in 2017 and 2018). 
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(KACND) and its head Sheikh Abdullah al-Mutlaq, a member of the Council of Senior Islamic 
Scholars. The topic in 2015 was ‘Extremism and its Effects on National Unity’.  
 
The Council of Senior Islamic Scholars frequently condemns terrorism, and has issued fatwas 
forbidding Saudis to travel to fight in Iraq and Syria.37 Moreover, the government has taken 
measures to standardise (though not unify, like in Egypt) Friday sermons.38 Mosque imams are 
monitored, and those who do not comply are sent for further training.39 In addition, the religious 
curricula in Saudi primary and middle schools has been reformed. The US State Department 
pressured the government to remove the concept of al-wala wa’l-bara from Saudi textbooks. 
(This is the idea that Muslims should disavow themselves from any authority that is not in 
conformity with [the Wahabi interpretation of] Islam). Yet critics say there is room for a more 
extensive overhaul.40 Western PVE experts have also called on the Kingdom to review copies 
of the Qur’an being distributed by Saudi NGOs.41  
 
Preventing violent extremism in the Kingdom under King Salman 
 
The Saudi Counselling Programme survived the 2017 demise of its founder, the once-powerful 
Prince Mohamed bin Nayef. Yet, after a royal decree in February 2014, Daesh members who 
have returned from Syria are not given the option of joining the rehabilitation programme. They 
are sent to a regular jail for a minimum of three years.42 
 
In a bid for power centralisation, Saudi PVE efforts since the rise of MbS have side-lined most 
of the Saudi religious establishment. MbS’s decision to create new, ad hoc institutions to 
combat violent extremism outside of the state religious institutions shows that he has taken 
steps to centralise ideological production. Notable here is the Global Centre for Combating 
Extremist Ideology, inaugurated in Riyadh during US President Donald Trump’s visit in May 
2017; in addition to the Saudi-led so-called ‘Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition’. 
These new institutions for combatting violent extremism have been placed under the Ministry 
of Defence, linking them directly to MbS.43 
 
                                                 
37 Nabil Mouline, ‘Enforcing and Reinforcing the State’s Islam: The Functioning of the Committee of Senior 
Scholars’, in Haykel, Hegghammer and Lacroix (eds.), Saudi Arabia in Transition, pp. 48–70, at p. 63. 
38 Afshin Shahi, The Politics of Truth Management in Saudi Arabia, London: Routledge, 2013, Chapter 3; 
39 Hafez, ‘Radicalization in the Persian Gulf’, at p. 11. 
40 Kelly McEvers, ‘Angry teachers and empty libraries’, Slate, 9 September 2009, https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2009/09/angry-teachers-and-empty-libraries.html; ‘Statement of Ms. Leanne Erdberg, director, 
Countering Violent Extremism, U.S. Institute of Peace, Hearing Leanne Erdberg, ‘Grading Counterterrorism 
Cooperation with the GCC States’, Washington D. C.: United States Institute for Peace’, Joint Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and the Subcommittee on the Middle East and 
North Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 115 Congress, second session, 26 
April 2018, accessible at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg29967/pdf/CHRG-115hhrg29967.pdf. 
41 John Hanna, ‘Elephants in the Room. Saudi Arabia can Win Islam’s War of Ideas’, Foreign Policy, 15 March 
2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/15/saudi-arabia-can-win-islams-war-of-ideas/#. 
42 Caryle Murphy, ‘Saudi Arabia tries to keep the Islamic State from recruiting its youth’, Agence France Press, 
2 March 2015, https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-03-02/saudi-arabia-tries-keep-islamic-state-recruiting-its-youth. 
43 Between 2015 and 2017, MbS was deputy crown prince and defence minister of the Kingdom, while his rival, 
Mohamed bin Nayef, controlled the Ministry of Interior and was crown prince. 
 10 
The Centre for Combating Extremist Ideology, also known as Etidal (Moderation), monitors 
jihadism online. It closes down websites and promotes counter-narratives built on universalistic 
values such as the idea of human dignity and a common humanity. The Islamic component 
appears relatively superficial. In the glossy publications of the centre, slogans of ‘positive 
thinking’ trump theological references. We may therefore ask: are such publications primarily 
addressed to Western public audiences, as public relations material for the ‘new Saudi model’, 
or do they (also) cater for Saudi citizens?  
 
Although it is difficult to establish a clear answer here, Saudi clerics are not at the forefront of 
Etidal. The centre created a supreme ideological council of twelve Muslim scholars from 
different countries. From the Saudi scene, only the most loyal palace ulama are involved. In 
2017, a committee was established by royal decree to monitor the use of ahadith (the sayings 
or actions of the Prophet) by Islamic preachers.44 Instead of involving the Saudi religious 
clerics, like the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars, it also involved a council of Islamic scholars 
from around the world.45 
 
The status of the Saudi clergy not only constitutes a salient domestic issue, it has foreign policy 
implications as well. Saudi religious scholars are key players in the propagation of Wahabi 
Islam worldwide. Historically, the House of Saud has given the clergy a right to organise a 
Saudi ‘religious diplomacy’, a source of Saudi Arabian soft power which complements and 
sometimes contradicts the Saudi foreign policies fronted by the various princes.46   
The main Saudi cleric in Etidal is Mohamed al-Issa, head of the Muslim World League (MWL). 
This Saudi-led NGO controls mosques and Islamic institutions on five continents, including 
five large Islamic centres in Europe.47 This is a source of Saudi Arabian soft power. While the 
heads of the MWL supported jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s (as did the USA),48 
representatives today condemn violence in the name of Islam. Former Secretary-General 
Abdallah al-Turki stated in 2015, ‘The terrorism that we face within the Muslim Ummah and 
our own homelands today … is religiously motivated. It has been founded on extremism, and 
the misconception of some distorted shari‘a concept.’49 
Al-Issa (b. 1965), a former justice minister, took over the MWL in 2016. He is a voice calling 
for moderation and tolerance inside and outside Saudi Arabia, and a trusted religious envoy of 
                                                 
44 Robert Spencer, ‘Saudi Arabia to monitor use of Muhammad’s sayings in order to counter jihad terrorism’, 
JihadWatch, 22 October 2017, https://www.jihadwatch.org/2017/10/saudi-arabia-to-monitor-use-of-
muhammads-sayings-in-order-to-counter-jihad-terrorism. 
45 This is not the first time that the House of Saud has turned to ulama in the Muslim world instead of Saudi 
clerics. King Abdallah requested international Islamic opinion in 2005 after the Council of Senior Islamic 
Scholars refused to authorise expanding a section of the Great Mosque in Mecca to welcome more pilgrims. 
Mouline, ‘Enforcing and reinforcing the State’s Islam’, at p. 66. 
46 ‘What do you mean by the paradoxes of Saudi ‘Religious diplomacy’? Stéphane Lacroix’, interview by 
MEDirections, 16 November 2017, https://youtu.be/GqXZH6jxjCA. 
47 Founded in 1962 to promote Islamic solidarity and oppose communism, the MWL is an example of early 
cooperation between Saudi Wahabi ulama and representatives of the Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. 
48 Thomas Hegghammer, ‘The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad’, 
International Security, 35:3, Winter 2010/2011:53–94, at p. 80. 
49 Edward Delman, ‘An anti-ISIS summit in Mecca’, The Atlantic, 25 February 2015. 
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MbS to the West. He visited the Vatican in Rome and the Grand Synagogue in Paris in late 
2017, and accompanied MbS to the US in March 2018, where he held a public speech at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy.50 Moreover, he issued an unprecedented letter 
condemning the denial of the Holocaust.51 Al-Issa, like Saudi Arabia, upholds that terrorism 
does not hail from one particular school of thought.52 
In Europe, the recent MWL promises of reforms have been followed up by concrete actions. 
Following a controversy that started after the 2016 Brussels attack, Saudi Arabia accepted that 
the MWL should cede control of the Great Mosque of Brussels to the Belgian authorities. In 
Geneva, Saudi Arabia recently (March 2018) accepted the replacement of a Saudi Salafi 
preacher with a former Saudi diplomat. These changes were also fuelled by the demands of 
European counter-terrorism agencies. The response from Riyadh highlights the eagerness of 
the Saudi crown prince for a good international reputation, and possibly, hopes of increased 
Western investment in the Kingdom.  
 
Within the Middle East, however, the Saudi discourse of moderation has been less obvious, at 
least so far. In the Levant for instance (see below), many Saudi-sponsored religious schools are 
not funded by the Saudi monarchy itself, but by Saudi private individuals. Such institutions 
promote a more politicised form of Salafism.  
 
Extremist thought has been spread in the Middle East as a side-effect of the Iranian–Saudi 
regional struggle. Saudi Arabia and Iran are both doing their best to mobilise their fellow Sunni 
and Shi‘a believers. Wahabi preachers returned as important Saudi foreign policy actors after 
2005, when they were used to oppose Iranian influence in the Middle East, Lebanon in 
particular.53  
 
So far, Saudi Arabia, like Iran, has seen its competition with Iran as being more important to 
its interests than the struggle against Daesh. This has been viewed as a major challenge in the 
global fight against violent extremism. Saudi Arabia’s Sheikh Rabi‘ al-Madkhali employs 
Islamic precepts, and anti-Shi‘ism, to justify the war in Yemen, with all its horrific humanitarian 
consequences.54 He also gives ideological support to Salafi fighting groups in Libya – just as 
the Saudi state used anti-Shi‘ism to legitimise the GCC intervention in Bahrain in 2011. Sheikh 
al-Madkhali belongs to a current of thought that was supported by the Kingdom in the 1990s 
                                                 
50 ‘Toward a More Moderate and Tolerant Islam: A Conversation with Dr. Mohammed Al-Issa’, The Washington 
Institute, 15 May 2018. https://youtu.be/H69ylaO1JwY. 
51 John Hanna, ‘Elephants in the Room. Saudi Arabia can Win Islam’s War of Ideas’, Foreign Policy, 15 March 
2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/15/saudi-arabia-can-win-islams-war-of-ideas/#. 
52 ‘Mohamed al-Issa, head of a Saudi-based Islamic organisation on terrorist ideology’, Al Arabiya English, 27 
November 2017, https://youtu.be/nKuK4nFQAW8. 
53 Tine Gade, Return to Tripoli: Battle over Minds and Meaning amongst Religious Leaders within the Islamist 
Field in Tripoli (Lebanon), FFI report, Kjeller, Norway, March 2009, 97–99. 
54 ‘Conseil aux gens du Yémen. Sheikh Rab‘i al-Madkhali’, speech given on 26 March 2015, transcribed and 
translated by Salafislam.fr. http://salafislam.fr/conseil-aux-gens-du-yemen-sheikh-rabi-al-madkhali/; ‘Advice to 
Ahl us-Sunnah in Yemen Regarding the Rafidah – Sheikh Muhammad al-Madkhali’, 18 February 2017, 
https://youtu.be/g6E2vCEEAQM. 
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against the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Sahwa Movement.55 He distinguishes himself by his 
anti-political stance and his insistence on the need to support the ruler (wali’ al-amir) to avoid 
chaos. Yet this ‘apoliticism’ is only really possible inside the Kingdom, if at all (depending on 
our definition of the ‘political’).56 In countries as different as Lebanon, Iraq and the UK, 
religious clerics close to Sheikh al-Madkhali’s line play a divisive role in their local societies.57  
 
Saudi Arabia has made several attempts to organise an Islamic Military Coalition against 
Daesh. The most recent was in December 2015, when it spearheaded the Islamic Military 
Counter Terrorism Coalition of 41 Muslim-majority countries against Daesh, with Iran notably 
absent. Closer scrutiny shows that this is as much a pact against Iran as one against jihadism, 
and the definition of terrorism used by the coalition extends to Iranian-sponsored groups such 
as Hizbullah.  
 
Is the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition another Saudi attempt to reconstitute a 
broad Sunni platform? It is difficult for Saudi Arabia to fight an internal Sunni war while it also 
opposes Iran. One option would be to open up to other (non-Wahabi) Islamic trends, and 
establish a common cause with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements against 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet, the 2017 Gulf crisis between Qatar and other GCC members 
showed that Saudi Arabia also deems it advantageous to exacerbate intra-Sunni divisions. The 
official line is that Saudi Arabia sees Qatar (and the Muslim Brotherhood organisations more 
broadly) as being allies of Iran, and plotting against Saudi interests inside and outside the 
Kingdom.58 
 
A new role for the Saudi clergy? 
 
The new Saudi counter-terrorism measures cannot be understood in isolation from the context 
of the on-going transformation of the Saudi social contract.59 Since being appointed deputy 
crown prince in 2015, and then crown prince in 2017, MbS has held power at the centre. For 
instance, he kept a dozen cabinet ministers and influential princes under house arrest in an 
alleged anti-corruption drive in 2017. In 2016, he launched Saudi Vision 2030, a policy of 
ambitious economic and social reforms aimed at diversifying the Kingdom’s dependence on oil 
and attracting more foreign investment. Importantly, MbS has vowed to modernise the Saudi 
religious field. He has launched a narrative according to which the ‘original’ Saudi ‘moderate 
                                                 
55 Stéphane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011, at p. 212.  
56 Laurent Bonnefoy, ‘L’illusion apolitique: adaptations, évolutions et instrumentalisations du salafisme 
yéménite’, in Bernard Rougier (ed.), Qu’est-ce que le Salafisme ?, Paris: PUF, 2008. 
57 Author’s interview with social activists in Lebanon 2008-2017, Kurdish region of Iraq 2016-2018, Oslo 2018. 
58 Informal discussion, Saudi researcher, place not disclosed, October 2018. 
59 See Stig Stenslie, ‘The End of Elite Unity and the Stability of Saudi Arabia’, The Washington Quarterly, 41:1, 
61–80, at pp. 73–75. 
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Islam’ was distorted after the 1979 capture of the Great Mosque in Mecca by Saudi Islamist 
dissidents,60 and now needs to be restored.61 
 
However, the Saudi religious field is more diverse than often believed. The Saudi religious 
establishment never fully recovered from the death of former Grand Mufti Ibn Baz, a highly 
respected figure, in 1999, and of Ibn Uthaymin in 2001.62 The current grand mufti, Abdul-Aziz 
ibn Abdallah Al ash-Sheikh, is considered a more servile ally to the House of Saud.63 Moreover, 
King Abdallah initiated political and religious reforms in 2005, and protected reformist scholars 
and intellectuals against conservatives.64 Greater space for free expression paved the way for 
new voices to be heard, even resulting in the religious establishment becoming divided on 
polarising issues such as gender segregation.  
 
Some Saudi clerics have taken reformist positions on ending gender segregation, the ban on 
female driving (formally lifted on June 2018) and on allowing ‘Western’ types of entertainment 
such as concerts and cinema. Another example is Sheikh Suleiman al-Turaifi, a retired 
employee from the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance, who has called for 
an overhaul of the Saudi school curriculum.65  
However, in 2016, MbS moved to cut some of the clergy’s traditional prerogatives, such as the 
ability of the religious police to apprehend people on the streets.66 Arrests have targeted very 
prominent religious figures, including political reformists such as Salman al-Awda, who 
supported the 2011 Arab uprisings, and Islamic constitutionalists. 67 In July 2018, they also 
extended to religious critics of Saudi foreign policies, like Safar al-Hawali.68 These figures 
played an important role in condemning jihadism in Saudi Arabia in the 2000s.69 
                                                 
60 See Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia, the Story of Juhayman 
al-‘Utaybi Revisited’, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2007-02, Vol. 39, No 1, pp. 103–122; 
Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, at p. 106. 
61 Martin Chulov, ‘I will return Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam, says crown prince’, The Guardian, 24 October 
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/i-will-return-saudi-arabia-moderate-islam-crown-prince. 
62 Stéphane Lacroix, ‘Between Islamists and Liberals: Saudi Arabia’s New “Islamo-Liberal” Reformists’, Middle 
East Journal, 58: 3, Summer 2004, pp. 345–365, at p. 346. 
63 Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, ‘Introduction’, in Haykel, Hegghammer and 
Lacroix (eds.), Saudi Arabia in Transition, 1–10, at p. 5. 
64 Eman Alhussein, ‘Reforming the Religious Discourse in Saudi Arabia (2001-2010)’, In Shahram Akbarzadeh 
(ed.), Routledge Handbook of Political Islam, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 179–190, at p. 187. 
65 Eman Alhussein, The Enlightened Sheikhs of the New Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf States Institute in 
Washington, 27 June 2018, https://agsiw.org/the-enlightened-sheikhs-of-the-new-saudi-arabia/. 
66 Lacroix, Stéphane, ‘En Arabie Saoudite, modernisation de l’autoritarisme. Vague d’arrestations et révolutions 
de palais’, Orient XXI, 25 September 2017. 
67 For the rise of the constitutionalist trend, see Stéphane Lacroix, ‘L’Arabie Saoudite, entre violence et 
réforme’, Politique étrangère, 2004, 69:4, pp. 743–754. 
68 Abdullah al-Aoudh, ‘State-sponsored Fatwas in Saudi Arabia’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 
April 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75971. ‘Saudi “seeks death penalty” for Muslim scholar Salman 
al-Awdah’, al-Jazeera, 5 September 2018, http://aje.io/vkth5. 
69 Stéphane Lacroix, ‘Understanding Stability and Dissent in the Kingdom. The Double-Edged Role of the 
Jama‘at in Saudi Politics’, in Haykel, Hegghammer and Lacroix (eds.), Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on 
Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change, pp. 167–180, at pp. 177–178. 
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Is this tendency towards state centralisation and control over the religious field, as seen in Egypt 
and elsewhere, reproducing itself in the Kingdom? Such political subjugation of Islam rarely 
occurs without a backlash. The recent arrests of reformist religious clerics and intellectuals and 
the clamp-down on the freedom of speech in Saudi Arabia have in fact stalled the discussion 
on reform of religious discourse. Moreover, the arrests undermine Saudi Arabia’s ability to 
combat violent extremism at the ideological level, because the number of influential religious 
figures able to take on this role becomes more limited.70  
The principle of full loyalty to the ruler in all circumstances (wali al-‘amr) is a central tenet of 
Wahabism, on which Saudi state (and regime) legitimacy is built. This religious principle 
explains why Saudi society has remained relatively apolitical. ‘Palace clerics’ have actively 
provided religious justification for the Kingdom’s policies, including unpopular measures.71  
Does the Kingdom have a Plan B for maintaining political loyalty from its citizens, should its 
religious legitimation wane? 
Expressions of Saudi nationalism (or ‘hyper-nationalism’), like the celebrations of the National 
Day, have grown in the two recent years.72 However, this discourse, a recent development, is 
relatively shallow and will probably be insufficient to bridge the gaps in Saudi society.73 Thus, 
whether the Kingdom can find other sources of political legitimacy outside of Wahabism will 
ultimately depend on the health of the Saudi economy. In this respect, the abrupt delay, in 
August 2018, of Aramco’s initial public offering (IPO) to 2021, blackened the hopes of success 
for the Vision 2030 reforms.74 
Moreover, at the global level, Saudi Arabia may risk losing some of its religious strength among 
Muslims outside the Kingdom. Indeed, the apparent political centralisation and 
instrumentalisation of the religious field is unpopular among some Muslims, at least in 
Europe.75 This may play to the advantage of more politicised strands of Salafism. 
To summarise, the Kingdom has maintained a two-tier system in which the Saudi crown prince 
can officially claim to be promoting ‘modernity’ and tolerance, while at the same time using 
the conservative clergy to mollify certain constituencies and counter Iranian influence at the 
regional level. For example, the new school textbooks still condemn Shi‘a and Sufi practices 
                                                 
70 For a study of influential female preachers in Saudi Arabia, see: Laila Makboul, ‘Beyond Preaching Women: 
Saudi Dāʿiyāt and Their Engagement in the Public Sphere’, Die Welt des Islams, 2017, 57 (3-4), pp. 303–328. 
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Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011, at p. 268. 
72 Eman Elhussein, ‘Filling the Void (2): Saudi Nationalism’, blog article posted on 22 September 2018, 
http://emanalhussein.com/2018/09/22/filling-the-void-2-nationalism/.  
73 Haykel, Hegghammer and Lacroix, ‘Introduction’, at p. 5. 
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and rituals.76 While new institutions that aim to combat extremist thought are being created, a 
profound theological liberalisation does not seem to be on the cards, at least not yet.  
Morocco: a ‘model’ in the fight against Daesh? 
There are at least four key characteristics of the relationship between the state and the religious 
field in Morocco: the legitimacy of state institutions; the effective role of state religious 
institutions in the prevention of violent extremism; the predominance of the Maliki tradition; 
and the inclusivity (or pluralism) of the Moroccan religious field .  
The religious credentials of the Alaoui royal dynasty, which has ruled Morocco since 1666, 
comes from its recognition as Sharifian (descending from the Prophet Mohamed) through the 
prestigious lineage of Ali Ibn Abi Talib and the Prophet’s daughter Fatima. Furthermore, the 
monarch carries the title Commander of the Faithful (amir al-mu’minin) (Article 41 of the 
Constitution) and is considered the sole authority of Islam in the country. Morocco remained 
independent during the Ottoman era, and, unlike in French Algeria (1830–1961) or in the 
French protectorate of Tunisia (1881–1956), Moroccan state structures were maintained during 
the French protectorate (1912–1956).  
Although the 2011 constitutional reforms gave the largest party in parliament the right to form 
a government, control of the Habous (Endowment) and Islamic Affairs Ministry has remained 
a Crown prerogative. It is considered a sovereign ministry, alongside the ministries of defence 
and of the interior.77 Although the government has been led by the Islamist PJD (Justice and 
Development Party) since 2012, the Makhzen remains in charge of the state religious 
institutions.78 It relied on Salafi-leaning personnel in the past, but this changed after Mohamed 
VI ascended to the throne (1999). In 2002, he appointed Ahmed Toufiq, a Sufi-oriented 
university professor in history and former director of the Institute of African Studies at 
Mohammed V University of Rabat-Agdal, to head the Ministry of Islamic Affairs.79 Toufiq is 
considered relatively secular – he has been called a ‘secular extremist’ by Abdelhamid 
Abounaim, a vocal Moroccan Salafi figure, who has been charged several times for inciting 
violence.80  
In the wake of the 2003 Casablanca attacks, King Mohamed VI reformed and strengthened the 
official religious institutions. Two new units were created within the Ministry of Islamic 
                                                 
76 ‘“They Are Not Our Brothers”. Hate Speech by Saudi Officials’, Human Rights Watch, September 2017. See 
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Affairs: one for the supervision of mosques and religious personnel, and another charged with 
reforming religious education. These reforms aimed to institutionalise and better regulate 
religious activities in Morocco – sometimes at the expense of expediency to the Makhzen.81 
Moreover, the role of the Supreme Ulama Council (ar-Rabita al-Mohamediyya), the authority 
to issue fatwas, was strengthened. The same was true for local Ulama Councils in the Moroccan 
provinces. At least publicly, the ministry took an inclusive approach, including imams close to 
the PJD into some of the councils. In addition, some imams were provided with motorcycles so 
as to appear ‘cool’, and to travel to meet young people and deconstruct extremist discourse.82 
Current projects aim to better use the potential for economic profit in the Habous, and to build 
Islamic libraries and cultural centres open to the public in Moroccan cities to upgrade religious 
education. 
Subjects such as history, philosophy, comparative religion and foreign languages were early on 
included in the curriculum of Islamic preachers.83 A pilot project has been the ‘Mohamed VI 
Institute for the Training of Imams, Mourchidines and Mourchidates’, inaugurated in 2015. It 
trains nearly 1000 imams from Morocco, Europe, Africa and the Middle East at spacious and 
modern facilities, and students are fully funded. The guiding principles of the new institute are 
to show the intent, tolerance, moderation and balance provided in shari‘a law.84 An important 
novelty is that degrees have been made accessible to women, who can become female religious 
guides certified by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. The Mourchidates, as they are called, are 
today active in Moroccan prisons, hospitals and youth centres.85 Trained to promote tolerant 
Islam, the Mourchidates engage in dialogue with women on the topic of radicalisation.  
The Mohamed V University in Rabat-Agdal is one of the first in the Arab world where shari‘a 
is taught within a department of Sociology, physically integrating secular and religious scholars 
into the same environment.86 Yet despite this ‘best practice’, meaningful scholarly interaction 
between professors of Religious Sciences and Social Sciences / Humanities is said to have 
remained limited. 
Could the pragmatic Maliki tradition partly explain the relative successes of religious reforms 
in Morocco? The Moroccan and Tunisian approach to Qur’an teaching puts emphasis on 
‘Contemporary Fiqh’ (fiqh al-waqi‘) (contemporary Islamic jurisprudence). Students examine 
the intention of the text, not only its literary sense. Harmonious co-existence between all 
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members of society, including non-Muslims, is considered to be an essential goal.87 Although 
Contemporary Fiqh can also be found in other contexts, the North African model focuses more 
on rationalism and logic, preparing students for critical thinking. This is at least the idea that 
the Makhzen wants to sell abroad, to promote itself as a model in the prevention of violent 
extremism and to counter Salafi groups at home.88 
Unlike academic forms of Islamic theological reformism (‘reform-Islam’), Sufism (like 
Salafism) has a popular following outside elite levels. Yet Sufism does not equal apoliticism: 
the Sufi-inspired ‘Justice and Spirituality’ Movement (al-Adl wa’l-Ihsan, hereafter: al-Adl) is 
probably the largest Islamist movement in Morocco, outstripping the Muslim Brotherhood-
inspired PJD and the Salafi trend. Al-Adl does not participate in elections, but it has been a 
vocal critic of the social and foreign policies in the Kingdom. Importantly, it never questions 
the religious basis of the royal dynasty.89  
Moroccan Sufi networks, like the Tidjania are also very powerful, and extend far into the Sahel. 
Morocco has a foreign policy interest in controlling these solidarity networks. Currently, many 
of these Moroccan-born brotherhoods rival the Saudi-sponsored influence of the Salafis in the 
Sahel. 
Morocco promotes itself, together with Spain, as a bridge for cultural understanding between 
Europe and the Islamic world, using the history of Al-Andalus (Islamic Iberia). Morocco’s 
religious diplomacy is very active in the Sahel and West Africa. Rabat has been training French 
imams in an interim period; the idea is for France to develop its own training centres.  
In 2014, the Islamic Affairs Ministry received requests from eight West African countries to 
train their imams in counter extremist thought. It has signed a religious cooperation agreement 
with Mali, to train 500 of its imams at the new institute in Rabat. The Moroccan investment in 
this can be explained by its regional ambitions and overall foreign policy, as well as economic 
interests.90 However, religious training from Moroccan institutions does not always yield 
popularity in Mali, or help clerics secure jobs as mosque imams.91  
In the years following the 2003 Casablanca attacks, many Salafi figures, including non-violent 
ones, were arrested or driven into exile.92 However, Morocco has also taken an inclusive 
approach to Salafism: it has pardoned Salafi jihadis by royal decree on several occasions, most 
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recently in 2015.93 Prominent Salafi jihadis have disengaged from violence, including 
Mohamed al-Fazazi, a Salafi sheikh who was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in 2003 for 
having ‘instigated’ and ‘praised’ violence. He was pardoned in 2011 (two months after the 20 
February protests began); becoming more pragmatic, in 2014 he led prayers before King 
Mohamed VI.94 Moreover, Mohamed al-Maghraoui, in exile in Saudi Arabia since the 
Casablanca attacks, has been allowed to return. Al-Fazazi, al-Maghraoui and others have 
founded faith-based NGOs and Islamic schools, while some former Salafi jihadi prisoners now 
profess adherence to the Maliki school.95 Moroccan Salafis would like to create a political party 
based on the model of the Egyptian al-Nour party, but it is uncertain how the Moroccan public 
would react to this. Moreover, such a development might provoke a split in the PJD, to the 
benefit of the Makhzen. Morocco promotes itself as a model in the fight against Daesh, but 
several shortcomings in its general approach to PVE have been noted, in particular the role 
granted to the security sector at the expense of addressing poverty.96 The low degree of 
coordination with neighbouring Algeria is also seen as a weakness in the Moroccan approach, 
given the often transnational outlook of radical groups, and the need for multilateral 
initiatives.97 Moreover, the necessity of the strict supervision of mosques is questioned by some 
researchers, on the grounds that radicalization in Morocco is believed to be more prominent 
online and in jails than in mosques.98 Morocco today is also facing its own problems of the 
Salafisation of the Maliki doctrine.99 
Morocco is among the top exporters of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. According to 
Moroccan intelligence agencies, by late 2014 approximately 1190 persons had left Morocco to 
join Daesh.100 In 2018, the number was believed to be around 1500.101 At least 220 of these are 
believed to be ex-jihadi convicts who have served time in Moroccan prisons.102 This could 
indicate that rehabilitation and reintegration programs for jihadis have not been successful.103 
Moreover, the high number of Moroccan foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq could indicate that 
Morocco’s security services did not sufficiently pursue potential foreign fighters at an early 
stage, and felt relieved when jihadis left the country.104 Being seen as a country that avoids 
terrorist attacks within by exporting jihad is of course undesirable.  
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Peace, 14 January 2016. 
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Since 2014, Moroccan intelligence has attempted to hinder jihadi departures to Syria: the 
Ministry of Justice led by the PJD proposed a new amendment to the terrorism law which 
imposed heavier punishments for joining terrorist groups in Morocco or outside. Moreover, the 
country joined the Global Coalition against Daesh in Syria and Iraq in September 2014. 
Morocco’s cooperation with Spain and other European countries to hinder the exfiltration of 
jihadis (and irregular migrants in general) to Europe is valued by the EU, although this has 
come at a price. Moroccan security services are valuable to European counterparts in fighting 
jihadi movements.105 However, human rights groups often criticise Moroccan security services 
for the conditions in places of detention. Morocco is not particularly hard-hit by EU criticism 
of its extra-constitutional treatment of political prisoners, because it believes that the EU needs 
its support on issues relating to immigration control and counter-terrorism.106 The Kingdom 
also serves as a gateway to the Sahel region, where it has massive economic investments and 
where France has been leading Operation Barkhane, a counter-terrorism operation constituted 
by the Sahel G5. 
In short, Morocco has implemented measures that have enabled it to combine inclusivity in the 
religious field with institutionalisation. The Moroccan religious institutions play an effective 
role because of the Kingdom’s religious legitimacy and due to a long history of inclusiveness 
in the religious field. The Moroccan model shows the unexploited potential inherent in making 
use of religious institutions in the prevention of violent extremism, and in focusing on early 
prevention rather than rehabilitation. This is not a ‘set model’ which can be readily exportable 
to other countries without due adaptations. However, the Moroccan efforts are admired in other 
Arab countries; Jordan, Egypt and the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRG) have implemented some 
similar measures. In Lebanon, on the other hand, this has been more difficult to achieve. 
However, religious personnel in a country as different as Lebanon also look to Morocco as a 
model of inspiration for how religious institutions could potentially play a role in the prevention 
of violent extremism.  
Lebanon: the need for religious autonomy and better recruitment 
Lebanon’s weak state, with a constant struggle among political-sectarian groups to control 
institutions, provides a counter example. The country’s approach to jihadism is heavily 
securitised, involving the security and judicial sectors in particular. Dar al-Fatwa, the Sunni 
religious institution, and other religious clerics, have not thus far been given an official role to 
prevent violent extremism, although many religious officials may have liked such a role.107 
Moreover, finding a national PVE strategy is a delicate political issue in a confessional political 
system like Lebanon. When the government launched its PVE strategy in 2017, a key concern 
was to avoid stigmatising one particular religion or sect.108  
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The relationship between the state and Sunni religious institutions in Lebanon sits at the core 
of domestic Sunni politics in Lebanon.109 The country’s consociational democracy confers a 
particular status on political leaders as heads their respective religious groups. (Lebanon has 18 
such groups, referred to as ‘sects’ – although Sunnis have always denied that they are a minority 
group.) The Lebanese Dar al-Fatwa is subordinate to the prime minister, a position reserved 
for Sunnis. Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri is known for his statement: ‘the reference of 
the mufti should be the prime minister’, i.e. that the mufti should defer to the Sunni prime 
minister. The mufti of the Republic is elected by a majority of laymen (the prime minister and 
Sunni ministers and MPs in office, in addition to former prime ministers).110 Religious clerics 
are in the minority among voters. This must be understood against the backdrop of the 
confessional democracy in which politicians are considered heads of sects. 
In Lebanon, official Sunni Islamic institutions cannot claim to have the same historical 
legitimacy as Al-Azhar. Lebanese institutions were created by the French mandate, and have 
never had strong popular support. They are weak and unable to control Islamist movements, 
which receive abundant funding from abroad. Today, most funding comes from public and 
private donors in the Gulf,111 but the pro-Syrian al-Ahbash112 and pro-Iranian Sunni groups are 
also present.113 Dar al Fatwa’s weakness should also be seen in the context of the weakening 
of Sunni power in the Lebanese political game, a trend since the assassination of Rafiq Hariri 
in 2005. 
The example of Tripoli illustrates the weakness of Dar al-Fatwa. Out of a total of more than 
110 mosques, only 44 are run by Dar al-Fatwa, the rest by private actors.114 Moreover, dozens 
of private shari‘a teaching institutes provide shari‘a education to youths at the pre-university 
level. Most of these institutes are managed by Salafi sheikhs with Gulf networks and funding. 
However, these diplomas are not recognised by the Lebanese state, which recognises only the 
official shari‘a school managed by Dar al-Fatwa. What drives students to attend Salafi shari‘a 
schools when they know that their diplomas will not be recognised by the state? 
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Motivations appear to be ideological as well as financial and practical. These students are often 
from very poor families, and join the shari‘a schools after dropping out of state schools. Many 
are dedicated Salafis and care less about the formal recognition of their diplomas. Moreover, 
some schools primarily educate women, who might not have ambitions to embark upon a career 
but wish to study shari‘a out of piety, or for personal development reasons.115 In the case of 
shari‘a schools catering for male students, school directors tend to be close to the Saudi 
religious establishment, and some (but not all) students are more radical. In a few cases in 2007 
and 2008, some students of religious schools dropped out and joined jihadi movements.116 This 
might be a special case, as the most extremist jihadis in Lebanon were not graduates of shari‘a 
schools: the radicals are those who do not know their shari‘a. Yet it still raises concerns. 
Lebanon’s Dar al-Fatwa has recognised that this fragmentation of the religious field is a 
challenge. During Fouad Siniora’s premiership, leading figures in Dar al-Fatwa launched a 
project aimed at unifying Sunni shari‘a curricula across Lebanon under its control, including a 
programme focused on tolerance and moderation. However, politicians appear to have shelved 
this issue. A major problem for Sunni institutions is that the state (and the Sunni prime minister 
in particular) do not seem to welcome any empowerment of state religious institutions, which 
would inevitably come at the expense of political expediency. Moreover, Sunni elites in 
Lebanon may feel reluctant to crush the autonomy of Islamist leaders who provide the support 
of some electoral constituencies and who back Sunni politicians at times of social tension with 
Hizbullah.  
The weakness of Lebanese official religious institutions makes it almost impossible to control 
private Salafi institutions of learning. Hubs of religious extremism continue to exist in Lebanon, 
with full state knowledge and often inaction (or laissez-faire).117 The key to reform could be to 
empower official religious institutions so that they can better coordinate and control extremist 
institutions. This will require granting greater political and financial autonomy to the local 
institutions. 
Low recruitment prevails even at more moderate shari‘a schools: those recruited to the PhD 
level in shari‘a degrees, and subsequently to the country’s top religious positions, are among 
the graduates of shari‘a secondary schools. As mentioned, these often hold poor standards. To 
improve the quality of religious personnel in Lebanon, the income level of imams will need to 
be upgraded. Today, the salaries of state-appointed religious officials are so low that it is 
impossible to subsist, even modestly, without taking additional salaries from politicians.118 
Local Dar al-Fatwa institutions in regions outside Beirut have limited funding for their events, 
and are forced towards politicians, and therefore, in turn, to subordination.  
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There is no room for a Western approach to religion. In recent years, European donors have 
helped the Lebanese Dar al-Fatwa enhance its capacities. 119 This has remained a locally-driven 
initiative, and limited in scope. Dar al-Fatwa has many skilled employees with a strong local 
reputation. If granted more autonomy and funding by the government, such skilled personnel 
within the local Dar al-Fatwa institutions have the potential to play a significant role in 
implementing measures to fight jihadism at the ideological level.  
Conclusions 
The degree to which religious actors are included in government strategies to prevent violent 
extremism in the Arab world differs. This paper has analysed three cases: Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco and Lebanon. While religious actors are granted an important role in Saudi Arabia 
and Morocco, this is not the case in Lebanon. Moreover, while Morocco places its official 
religious institutions at the centre of programmes to train imams, Saudi Arabia has recently 
taken steps to create new, ad hoc institutions to prevent violent extremism, sidelining its official 
religious institutions.  
Morocco and Saudi Arabia both use religious diplomacy  to address the challenge of violent 
extremism. Morocco attempts to portray itself as a privileged partner of the West in the Islamic 
world, educating imams from France and the Sahel. Moreover, through its deployment of 
religious soft power, it seeks to consolidate economic interests in the Sahel.  
By contrast, Saudi Arabia has faced more criticism because of the Saud family’s 274-year-old 
pact with Wahabism. However, it tries to counter this through the Saudi-led NGO Muslim 
World League, which has recently taken a more active role in promoting religious moderation 
in Europe. However, several of the crown prince’s policies in recent years run counter to his 
declarations of wanting to strengthen moderate Islam inside the Kingdom. First, the recent 
clamp-downs on freedom of speech have brought the process of religious reform to a halt. 
Second, the recent arrests of Islamic figures and intellectuals have hampered the Kingdom’s 
ability to effectively prevent violent extremism, as there are fewer credible figures available to 
take on this role. Third, Saudi Arabia continues to consider the regional contest with Iran as 
more important than the ideological struggle against extremist thought. 
What the transformations in Saudi Arabia could mean for Islamic networks worldwide is still 
uncertain. Yet, countries like Morocco appear ready to take a more active global role in 
exporting Islam, should Saudi Arabia wish to withdraw from this role. However, such a scenario 
seems unlikely, given the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Although pluralism of the religious field is considered essential to prevent violent extremism, 
measures taken under the umbrella term PVE in the Arab world often move in the opposite 
direction. While Morocco has concentrated efforts on the prevention side, Saudi Arabia’s 
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Counselling Programme is about the rehabilitation of jihadis. Since 2014, many Arab countries 
have strengthened government control over religious activities, standardising religious 
discourse under the pretence of fighting the ideology of Daesh. However, official religious 
institutions are not only used against jihadi groups, but also to counter domestic political (and 
electoral) competitors to the regimes. This prevents freedom of thought and re-asserts 
authoritarianism, under the pretence of being a measure against violent extremism. Saudi 
Arabia is a case in point, but it is far from the only Arab country to do so. In Morocco, the 
government has taken a more active role in monitoring religious activities. That said, Rabat 
distinguishes itself by its tradition of greater inclusivity in the religious field compared to other 
Arab countries.  
Interestingly, governments’ standardisation (or uniformisation) of religious discourse may 
prove negative for the prevention of violent extremism. Government-supported religious 
leaders often lack credibility, and are unable to play an effective role. Moreover, Western 
support for state religious institutions in the Arab world could further discredit them, hence 
potentially weakening their capacity to promote counter-narratives to jihadism. In order to fight 
violent extremism, religious institutions will need to be granted more autonomy, not less, 
moving towards general political liberalisation. However, in the current situation of turmoil in 
the Arab world, this is unlikely. Moreover, although inclusivity and pluralism in the religious 
field are needed, the Moroccan case has shown the potential gains when the state takes an active 
role in coordinating and supporting religious education and infrastructure. 
 
Lebanon provides a counter example, not so much in the political expediency of its Sunni 
religious institutions, which we observe throughout the Sunni Islamic world, but in other 
aspects. (That said, in monarchies with inherited religious legitimacy, like Saudi Arabia and 
Morocco, cooperation with the regimes may seem more acceptable for clergymen than in multi-
confessional Lebanon.) Lebanon’s Dar al-Fatwa distinguishes itself by its blatant weakness, 
lack of funding and legitimacy, especially in the provinces. The country’s Sunni religious field 
is therefore more easily penetrated by regional and transnational influences, as well as by 
private interests. Due to the notoriously low salaries granted to Islamic preachers, some chose 
to become the clients of local political notables. This reflects the recurrent weakness of the 
Lebanese state. Although Lebanon and Morocco are very different cases, the ancient ‘country 
of Cedars’ could take inspiration from its North African counterpart on the issue of investment 
into Islamic education and infrastructure. Prioritising upgrading religious education could make 
Lebanon more resilient in the face of regional turmoil.  
However, solutions are not that easy to come by. It is not certain that religious reform should 
be the priority in  preventing violent extremism. The religious reform literature is often written 
in an academic form and its reception limited to the intellectual, urban elites. Such discourse is 
not appealing to already committed extremists. Moreover, Salafism has a near-monopoly on 
popular mobilisation in the West and the Middle East. Some Salafi preachers play a divisive 
role in their local societies. Morocco tries to offer its Maliki-based religious institutions as an 
alternative, but rebuilding a non-Salafi Islam is not easy. Moroccan-educated preachers do not 
always find a job when returning to Mali, for example. However, as mentioned in the 
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introduction, credible religious actors have a role to play in clarifying religious concepts to 
believers to avoid the misuse of religion by extremist groups. 
A final point is that if violent extremism is caused by social and political factors, and not by 
religious beliefs, counter-measures should target job creation, improve governance and the rule 
of law, and address the perceived sectarian-based discrimination of certain groups. PVE 
measures focusing mainly on education and tolerance in society, and not addressing governance 
and the rule of law, often miss the main point: that radicalization is more often than not a 
response to poor governance. 
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